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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-430 
ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. LANCE GATES ET ux. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ILLINOIS 
[May , 1983] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Respondents Lance and Susan Gates were indicted for vi-
olation of state drug laws after police officers, executing a 
search warrant, discovered marijuana and other contraband 
in their automobile and home. Prior to trial the Gates' 
moved to suppress evidence seized during this search. The 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of lower state 
courts granting the motion. It held that the affidavit sub-
mitted in support of the State's application for a warrant to 
search the Gates'i property was inadequate under this 
Court's decisions in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964) 
and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969). 
We granted certiorari to consider the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to a magistrate's issuance of a search 
warrant on the basis of a partially corroborated anonymous 
informant's tip. After receiving briefs and hearing oral ar-
gument on this question, however, we requested the parties 
to address an additional question: 
"Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal 
trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), should to any ex-
tent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the 
exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief 
2 
81-430--0PINION 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 
that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment." 
We decide today, with apologies to all, that the issue we 
framed for the parties was not presented to the Illinois courts 
and, accordingly, do not address it. Rather, we consider the 
question originally presented in the petition for certiorari, 
and conclude that the Illinois Supreme Court read the re-
quirements of our Fourth Amendment decisions too restric-
tively. Initially, however, we set forth our reasons for not 
addressing the question regarding modification of the ex-
clusionary rule framed in our order of November 29, 1982, 
-U.S. . 
I 
.... 
Our certiorari jurisdiction over decisions from VWDWHFRcourts 
derives from 28 U. S. C. § 1257, which provides that "Final 
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a 
·state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court as follows: ... (3) By writ of certiorari, 
... where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially 
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes 
of ... the United States." The provision derives, albeit 
with important alterations, see, e. g., Act of December 23, 
1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 
929, from the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. 
Although we have spoken frequently on the meaning of 
§ 1257 and its predecessors, our decisions are in some re-
spects not entirely clear. We held early on that § 25 of the 
rr- -
Judiciary Act of 1789 furnished us with no Jurisdiction unless 
a federal question had been both raised and decided in the 
state court below. As Justice Story wrote in Crowell v. 
Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 391 (1836), "If both of these require-
ments do not appear on the record, the appellate jurisdiction 
fails." See also Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranclr. 344 
(1809). 1 v 
1 The apparent rule of Crowell v. Randell, supra, that a federal claim 
~1-l~~O----l)l)IN lON 
lLLl t l l~ e ~ATE~ 
1\l(.lrt.'\ rt.LLlltly, in ~1/c(n>/({l·irk Y. (\H>ipct5]lliC (;CH ' t('t{(', 30~ 
l r. ~- 4~~0. 4~~5--4· l) ~.1}1-40). the Court observed: 
But it i~ also the settled practice of this Court. ill the e."-
t"\reis.e of it~ app llat jurisdiction. thnt it is only il1 e .·cep-
ti 1nal ea~e8, and then )nl~r in ea8t: s ron1ing fron1 the fed-
er~1l t•ourt~. that it consider~ qtl stions urged by a ..; 
petitio11 r or appellant 11ot pres8 d or passed upon il1 tl1e 
~ourt~ belo''. . . . In cases con1ing l1ere from ~tate 
courts ii1 ,,·hi~h a st·:1te statt1te is a~sailed as Ul1COI1stitll-
tional. there are reasons of pect1liar force \Yhiel1 sl1ol1ld 
lead us to refrai11 fron1 decidi11g· qtlestions 11ot prese11ted 
or decided in the higl1est cotlrt of the state \Vhose jlldicial 
action \Ye are called upon to revie\\. _..;\part fron1 the re-
lucte:ulce \Vith ''"hich eYer~ .. eot1rt sl1ot1ld proceed to set 
aside legislatio11 as ut1constitutiot1al 011 grou11ds 11ot prop-
erl~ prese11ted. due regard for tl1e appropriate relatioi1-
ship of this Court to state cotlrts reqt1ires tls to decline to 
consider a11d decide qttestio11s affecti11g the v·alidity of 
state stattttes 11ot urged or cot1sidered tl1ere. It is for 
'-' 
these reasons tl1at this Cotll1:, ''here the constittltiollal-
it) of a stattlte has bee11 tlpheld in the state cotlrt. col1-
sistent1) refuses to consider a11. r grot1nds of attack 11ot 
raised or decided in that cot1rt. -
Fina11 ... the Court ~eemed to reaffirm the jt1risdictio11al ~h,u·­
acter of the rule agai11~t otir deciding claim~ ·11ot pressed nor 
pa~sed upon' in tate court in Stat Fa:·rn 111 tt1tal .. 4.. tt0?110-
bile I t u ·a1tce o. . D tt l 324 U. . 15 , lt:>O 1945). \\here 
ha\ e been both rai~ d and addr "'~ed in ~t·it court "as enerallv not un-
- ' 
der""tood in the literal fa~hion in \Vhich it \\as phra~ d. ~ e R. Robertson 
& F. Kirkham, Juri diction of th upr n1 ourt f th nit d tate~~ t)O 
(1951). In~tead the otn1 d , .. lop d th rul that a clain1 ''"ould not be 
con, idered here unle it had b n ith r rais d or squarely considered and 
re ol' ed in ~tate court. , . g.. 1 cGold ·1· k v. onzpag1vit (Tt n 1ll l • 
309 U. . 30, 35-436 19 0 : tat Fa ·nz 1utua l ln ~~o~ ~ce o. "'· D 1t L 
32 u. -. 15 160 19 5 . 
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we explained that "Since the [state] Supreme Court did not 
pass on the question, we may not do so." See also Hill v. 
California, 401 U. S. 797, 805-806 (1971). 
Notwithstanding these decisions, however, several of our 
more recent cases have treated the so-called "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule as merely a prudential restriction. / 
In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1. (1949), the Court re-
versed a state criminal conviction on a ground not urged in 
state court, nor even in this Court. Likewise, in Vachon v. 
New Hampshire, 414 U. S. 478 (1974), the Court summarily 
reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground, not raised 
in state court, or here, that it had been obtained in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court indicated in a footnote, id., at 479, n. 3, that it pos-
sessed discretion to ignore the failure to raise in state court 
the question on which it decided the case. 
In addition to this lack of clarity as to the character of the 
"not pressed or passed upon below" rule, we have recognized 
that it often may be unclear whether the particular federal 
question presented in this Court was raised or passed upon 
below. In Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 197-198 
(1899), the fullest treatment of the subject, the Court said 
that "if the question were only an enlargement of the one 
mentioned in the assignment of errors, or if it were so con-
nected with it in substance as to form but another ground or 
reason for alleging the invalidity of the [lower court's] judg-
ment, we should have no hesitation in holding the assignment 
sufficient to permit the question to be now raised and argued. 
Parties are not confined here to the same arguments which 
were advanced in the courts below upon a Federal question 
there discussed." 2 We have not attempted, and likely 
2 In Dewey, certain assessments had been levied against the owner of 
property abutting a street paved by the city; a state trial court ordered 
that the property be forfeited when the assessments were not paid, and in 
81-430--0PINION 
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would not have been able, to draw a clear-cut line between 
cases involving only an "enlargement" of questions presented 
below and those involving entirely new questions. 
The application of these principles in the instant case is not 
entirely straightforward. It is clear in this case that re-
spondents expressly raised, at every level of the Illinois judi-
cial system, the claim that the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated by the actions of the. Illinois police and that the evi-
dence seized by the officers should be excluded from their 
trial. It also is clear that the State challenged, at every level 
of the Illinois court system, respondents' claim that the sub-
stantive requirements of the Fourth Amendment had been 
violated. The State never, however, raised or addressed 
the question whether the federal exclusionary rule should 
be modified in any respect, and none of the opinions of the 
Illinois courts give any indication that the question was 
considered. 
The case, of course, is before us on the State's petition for a 
writ of certiorari. Since the Act of December 23, 1914, c. 2, 
38 Stat. 790, jurisdiction has been vested in this Court tore-
view state court decisions even when a claimed federal right 
has been upheld. Our prior decisions interpreting the "not 
pressed or passed on below" rule have not, however, in-
volved a State's failu~ to raise a defense to a federal right or 
remedy asserted below. As explained below, however, we 
addition, held appellant personally liable for the amount by which the as-
sessments exceeded the value of the lots. In state court the appellant ar-
gued that the imposition of personal liability against him violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because he had not re-
ceived personal notice of the assessment proceedings. In this Court, he 
also attempted to argue that the assessment itself constituted a taking 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that, beyond arising 
from a single factual occUITence, the two claims "are not in anywise neces-
sarily connected," id., at 198. Because of this, we concluded that appel-
lant's taking claim could not be considered. 
81- 4:30-0PIN ION 
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can see no reason to treat the State's failure to have chal-
lenged an asserted federal claim differently from the failure 
of the proponent of a federal claim to have raised that claim. 
We have identified several purposes underlying the "not 
pressed or passed upon" rule: for the most part, these are as 
applicable to the State's failure to have opposed the assertion 
of a particular federal right, as to a party's failure to have as-
serted the claim. First, "questions not raised below are 
those on which the record is very likely to be inadequate 
since it certainly was not compiled with those questions in 
mind." Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437, 439 (1969). 
Exactly the same difficulty exists when the state urges modi-
fication of an existing constitutional right or accompanying 
remedy. Here, for example, the record contains little, if 
anything, regarding the subjective good faith of the police of-
ficers that searched the Gates's property-which might well 
be an important consideration in fashioning a good faith ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. Our consideration of the 
mooification of the exclusionary rule plainly would benefit 
from a record containing such facts. 
Likewise, "due regard for the appropriate relationship of 
this Court to state courts," McGoldrick v. Compagnie 
Generate, 309 U. S. 430, 43~36 (1940), demands that those 
courts be given an opportunity to consider the constitutional-
ity of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, 
proposed changes in existing remedies for unconstitutional 
actions. Finally, by requiring that the State first argue to 
the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be 
modified, we permit a state court, even if it agrees with the 
State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an ade-
quate and independent state ground. See Cardinale, supra, 
394 U. S., at 439. Illinois, for example, adopted an exclu-
sionary rule as early as 1923, see People v. Brocamp, 138 
N. E. 728 (1923), and might adhere to its view even if it 
thought we would conclude that the federal rule should be 
modified. In short, the reasons supporting our refusal to 
• 
• 
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hear federal claims not raised in state court apply with equal 
force to the State's failure to challenge the availability of a 
well-settled federal remedy. Whether the "not pressed or 
passed upon below" rule is jurisdictional, as our earlier deci-
sions indicate, see , supra, or prudential, as several of 
our later decisions assume, nor whether its character might 
be different in cases like this from its character elsewhere, 
we need not decide. Whatever the character of the rule may 
be, consideration of the question presented in our order of 
November 29, 1982, would be contrary to the sound justifica-
tions for the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, and we 
thus decide not to pass on the issue. 
The fact that the Illinois courts affirmatively applied the 
1 federal exclusionary rule suppressing evidence against re-
spondents-does not affect our conclusion. In Morris on v. 
Watson, 154 U. S. 111 (1894), the Court was asked to con-
sider whether a state statute impaired the appellant's con-
tract with the appellee. It declined to hear the case because 
the question presented here had not been pressed or passed 
on below. The Court acknowledged that the lower court's 
opinion had restated the conclusion, set forth in an earlier de-
cision of that court, that the state statute did not impermissi-
bly impair contractual obligations. Nonetheless, it held that 
there was no showing that "there was any real contest at any 
stage of this case upon the point," id., at 115, and that with-
out such a contest, the routine restatement and application of 
settled law by an appellate court did not satisfy the "not 
pressed or passed upon below'' rule. Similarly, in the 
present case, although the Illinois courts applied the federal 
exclusionary rule, there was never "any real contest" upon 
the point. The application of the exclusionary rule was 
merely a routine act, once a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment had been found, and not the considered judgment of the 
Illinois courts on the question whether application of a modi-
fied rule would be warranted on the facts of this case. In 
such circumstances, absent the adversarial dispute necessary 
81-430--0PINION 
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to apprise ~he state court o:t: the arguments for not applying 
the exclusionary rule, we ( will not consider the question 
whether _t_he exclusionary rule should be modified. 
Likewise we do not believe that the State's repeated oppo-
sition to respondent's substantive Fourth Amendment claims 
suffices to have raised the question whether the exclusionary 
rule should be modified. The exclusionary rule is "a judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally" and not ''a personal constitutional 
right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra, 
414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). The question whether the exclu-
sionary rule's remedy is appropriate in a particular context 
has long been regarded as an issue separate from the ques-
tion whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct. 
See, e. g., United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620 (1980); 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268 (1978); United 
States v. Calandra, supra; Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 
(1976). Because of this distinction, we cannot say that modi-
fication or abolition of the exclusionary rule is "so connected 
with [the substantive Fourth Amendment right at issue] as 
to form but another ground or reason for alleging the invalid-
ity" of the judgment. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 173 
U. S., at 197-198. Rather, the rule's modification was, for 
purposes of the "not pressed or passed upon below" rule, a 
separate claim that had to be specifically presented to the 
State courts. 
Finally, weighty prudential considerations militate against 
our considering the question presented in our order of No-
vember 29, 1983. The extent of the continued vitality of the 
rules that have developed from our decisions in Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1961), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U. S. 643 (1961), is an issue of unusual significance. Suffi-
cient evidence of this lies just in the comments on the issue 
that members of this Court recently have made, e. g., Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971) 
81-430-0PINION 
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(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U. S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); id., at 502 
(Black, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 
537-539 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 
430 U. S. 387, 413--414 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring); Rob-
bins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 437, 443 444 (1981) (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting). Where difficult issues of great public / 
importance are involved, there are strong reasons to adhere 
scrupulously to the customary limitations on our discretion. 
By doing so we "promote respect ... for the Court's adjudi-
catory process [and] the stability of [our] decisions." Mapp 
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U. S., at 677 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, fidelity to the rule guarantees that a factual 
record will be available to us, thereby discouraging the fram-
ing of broad rules, seemingly sensible on one set of facts, 
which may prove ill-considered in other circumstances. In 
Justice Harlan's words, adherence to the rule lessens the 
threat of "untoward practical ramifications," id., at 676 (Har-
lan, J., dissenting), not foreseen at the time of decision. The 
public importance of our decisions in Weeks and M app and 
the emotions engendered by the debate surrounding these 
decisions counsel that we meticulously observe our custom-
ary procedural rules. By following this course, we promote 
respect for the procedures by which our decisions are ren-
dered, as well as confidence in the stability of prior decisions. 
A wise exercise of the powers confided in this Court dictates 
that we reserve for another day the question whether the ex-
clusionary rule should be modified. 
II 
We now turn to the question presented in the State's origi-
nal petition for certiorari, which requires us to decide 
whether respondents' rights under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments were violated 'by the search of their car 
and house. A chronological statement of events usefully in-
troduces the issues at stake. Bloomingdale, Ill., is a suburb 
• 
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of Chicago located in DuPage County. On May 3, 1978, the 
Bloomingdale Police Department received by mail an anony-
mous handwritten letter which read as follows: 
"This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in 
your town who strictly make their living on selling 
drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on 
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. 
Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife 
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be 
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it 
back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Flor-
ida. May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance 
will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At 
the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk 
loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they 
have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement. 
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and 
make their entire living on pushers. 
I guarentee if you watch them c~refully you will make 
a big catch. They are friends with some big drugs deal-
ers, who visit their house often. 
Lance & Susan Gates 
Greenway 
in Condominiums" 
The letter was referred by the Chief of Police of the Bloom-
ingdale Police Department to Detective Mader, who decided 
to pursue the tip. Mader learned, from the office of the Illi-
nois Secretary of State, that an Illinois driver's license had 
been issued to one Lance Gates residing at a stated address 
in Bloomingdale. He contacted confidential informant, 
whose examination of ce a1n ncial records revealed a 
more recent address for the Ga es, nd he also learned from a 
police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates" had 
made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West 
Palm Beach, Fla., scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 
5 at 4:15 p.m. 
81-430-0PINION 
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Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration for surveillance of the May 5 
Eastern Airlines flight. The agent later reported to Mader 
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in 
Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and 
take a taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported 
that Gates went to a room registered to one Susan Gates and 
that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and an unidenti-
fied woman left the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois li-
cense plates and drove northbound on an interstate fre-
quently used by travelers to the Chicago area. In addition, 
the DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate num-
ber on the Mercury registered to a Hornet station wagon 
owned by Gates. The agent also advised Mader that the 
driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale 
was approximately 22 to 24 hours. 
Mader signed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing facts, 
and submitted it to a judge of the Circuit Court of DuPage 
County, together with a copy of the anonymous letter. The 
judge of that court thereupon issued a search warrant for the 
Gates's residence and for their automobile. The judge, in 
deciding to issue the warrant, could have determined that the 
modus operandi of the Gates had been substantially corrobo-
rated. As the anonymous letter predicted, Lance Gates had 
flown from Chicago to West Palm Beach late in the afternoon 
of May 5th, had checked into a hotel room registered in the 
name of his wife, and, at 7:00a.m. the following morning, had 
headed .north, accompanied by an unidentified woman, out of 
West Palm Beach on an interstate highway used by travelers 
from South Florida to Chicago in an automobile bearing a li-
cense plate issued to him. 
At 5:15a.m. on March 7th, only 36 hours after he had flown 
out of Chicago, Lance Gates, an<;} his wife, returned to their 
home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in which they had left 
West Palm Beach some 22 ho·urs earlier. The Bloomingdale 
police were awaiting them, searched the trunk of the Mer-
cury, and uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana. 
81-430-0PINION 
12 ILLINOIS v. GATES 
A search of the Gates's home revealed marijuana, weapons, 
and other contraband. The Illinois Circuit Court ordered 
suppression of all these items, on the ground that the affida-
vit submitted to the Circuit Judge failed to support the neces-
sary determination of probable cause to believe that the 
Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in 
question. This decision was affirmed in turn by the Illinois 
Appellate Court and by a divided vote of the Supreme Court 
of Illinois. 
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded-and we are inclined 
to agree that, standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to 
the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the 
basis for a magistrate's determination that there was proba-
- ble cause to believe contraband would be found in the Gates's 
car and home. The letter provides virtually nothing from 
which one might conclude that its author is either honest or 
his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives absolutely 
no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regard-
ing the Gates's criminal activities. Something more was re-
quired, then, before a magistrate could conclude that there 
was probable cause to believe that contraband would be 
found in the Gates's home and car. See Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U. S. 108, 109, n. 1 (1964); Nathanson v. United States, 
290 u. s. 41 (1933). 
The Illinois Supreme Court also properly recognized that 
Detective Mader's affidavit might be capable of supplement-
ing the anonymous letter with infortnation sufficient to per-
mit a detennination of probable cause. See Whitely v. War-
den, 401 U. S. 560, 567 (1971). In holding that the affidavit 
in fact did not contain sufficient additional infortnation to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause, the Illinois court ap-
plied a "two-pronged test," derived from our decision in 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969).3 The Illinois 
3 In Spinelli, police officers observed Mr. Spinelli going to and from a 
particular apartment, which the telephone company aid contained two 
81-430-0PINION 
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Supreme Court, like some others, apparently understood 
Spinelli as requiring that the anonymous letter satisfy each 
of two independent requirements before it could be relied on. 
J·. A., at 5. According to this view, the letter, as supple-
mented by Mader's affidavit, first had to adequately reveal 
the "basis of knowledge" of the letter writer-the particular 
means by which he came by the information given in his re-
port. Second, it had to provide facts sufficiently establishing 
either the "veracity" of the affiant's informant, or, alterna-
tively, the "reliability" of the informant's report in this par-
ticular case. 
The Illinois court, alluding to an elaborate set of legal rules 
that have developed among various lower courts to enforce 
the "two-pronged test," 4 found that the test had not been 
telephones with stated numbers. The officers also were "informed by a 
confidential reliable infonnant that William Spinelli [was engaging in illegal 
gambling activities]" at the apartment, and that he used two phones, with 
numbers corresponding to those possessed by the police. The officers sub-
mitted an affidavit with this information to a magistrate and obtained a 
warrant to search Spinelli's apartment. We held that the magistrate could 
have made his determination of probable cause only by "abdicating his con-
stitutional function," id., at 416. The Government's affidavit contained 
absolutely no information regarding the informant's reliability. Thus, it 
did not satisfy Aguilar's requirement that such affidavits contain "some 
of the underlying circumstances'' indicating that "the informant . . . was 
'credible'" or that "his information [was] 'reliable."' Aguilar, supra, 378 
U. S., at 114. In addition, the tip failed to satisfy Agui lar's requirement 
that it detail "some of the underlying circumstances from which the infor-
mant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he claimed they were. We 
also held that if the tip concerning Spinelli had contained "sufficient detail'' 
to permit the magistrate to conclude "that he [was] relying on something 
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an 
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation," 393 U. S., 
at 416, then he properly could have relied on it; we thought, however, that 
the tip lacked the requisite detail to pennit tnis "self-verifying detail" 
analysis. 
4 See, e. g., Stanle v. State, 313 A. 2d 847 (Md. App. 1974). In urn-
mary, these rules osit that the "veracity'' prong of the pinel l. te t has 
81-430-0PINION 
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satisfied. First, the "veracity" prong was not satisfied be-
cause, "there was simply no basis [for] ... conclud[ing) that 
the anonymous person [who wrote the letter to the Blooming-
dale Police Department] was credible." J. A., at 7a. The 
court indicated that corroboration by police of details con- ( 
tained in the letter might never satisfy the "veracity" prong, , 
and in any event, could not do so if, as in ,the present case, 
only "innocent" details are corroborated. J. A.1 at 12. In 
addition, the letter gave no indication of the basis of its writ-
er's knowledge of the Gates's activities. The Illinois court 
understood Spinelli as permitting the detail contained in a tip 
to be used to infer that the informant had a reliable basis for 
his statements, but it thought that the anonymous letter 
failed to provide sufficient detail to permit such an inference. 
Thus, it concluded that no showing of probable cause had 
been made. 
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an infor-
mant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are 
two "spurs''-the informant's "credibility" and the "reliability" of his in-
formation. Various interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the 
''reliability'' spur of the "veracity'' prong. Both the "basis of knowledge" 
prong and the "veracity'' prong are treated as entirely separate require-
ments, which must be independently satisfied in every case in order to sus-
tain a determination of probable cause. See n. 5, infra. Some ancillary 
doctrines are relied on to satisfy certain of the foregoing requirements. 
For example, the "self-verifying detail" of a tip may satisfy the "basis of 
knowledge" requirement, although not the "credibility" spur of the "verac-
ity'' prong. See J. A. lOa. Conversely, corroboration would seem not ca-
pable of supporting the "basis of knowledge" prong, but only the "veracity" 
prong. /d., at 12a. 
The decision in Stanley, while expressly approving and conscientiously 
attempting to apply the "two-pronged test'' observes that "[t]he built-in 
subtleties [of the test] are such, however, t at a slipshod application calls 
down upon us the fury of Murphy's Law." 313 A. 2d, at 860 (footnote 
omitted).'' The decision also suggested that it is necessary "to evolve 
analogous guidelines [to hearsay rules employed in trial settings] for the 
reception of hearsay in a probable cause setting.'' I d., at 857. 
• 
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all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. 
We do not agree, however, that these elements should be un-
derstood as entirely separate and independent requirements 1 
to be rigidly exacted in every case, 5 which the opinion of the v 
Supreme Court of Illinois would imply. Rather, as detailed 
below, they should be understood simply as closely inter-
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the common-
sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to 
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular 
place. 
III 
Thls totality of the circumstances approach is far more con- / 
sistent with our prior treatment of probable cause 6 than is 
5 The entirely independent character that the Spinelli prongs have as-
sumed is indicated both by the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in this 
case, and by decisions of other courts. One frequently cited decision, 
Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), remarks that "the 
dual requirements represented by the 'two-pronged test' are 'analytically 
severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over to make up for 
a deficit on the other prong." See also n. 9, infra. 
6 Our original phrasing of the so-called "two-pronged test" in Aguilar v. 
Texas, 318 U. S. 108 (1969), suggests that the two prongs were intended 
simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of probable cause, 
not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every case. In 
Aguilar, we required only that: 
the magistrate must be infonned of some of the underlying circumstances 
from which the informant concluded that . . . narcotics were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which 
the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible' or his infonna-
tion 'reliable.''' /d., at 114 (emphasis added). 
As our language indicates, we intended neither a rigid compartmentaliza-
tion of the inquiries into an informant's "verncity," "reliability'' and ''basis 
of knowledge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an infor-
mant's tip. Rather, we required only that some facts bearing on two par-
ticular issues be provided to the magistrate. Our decision in Jaben v. 
United States, ,381 U. S. 214 (1965), demonstrated this latter point. We 
held there that a criminal complaint showed probable cause to belie e the 
defendant had attempted to evade the payment of income ta e . com-
, 
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~ny rigid ,de~and that specific "tests" be satisfied by every 
I~ormant ~ tip. Perhaps the central teaching of our deci-
Sions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a 
"practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). "In dealing with probable J 
cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabil-
ities. These are not technical; they are the factual and prac-
tical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act." ld., at 175. Our 
observation in United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 
(1981), regarding "particularized suspicion," is also applicable 
to the probable cause standard: 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors 
as factfinders are permitted to do the same and so are 
Jaw enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus 
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of li-
brary analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement. 
As these comments illustrate, probable cause is a fluid con-
cept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules. Informants' tips doubtless come in 
mented that: 
"Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some 
degree of reliability upon the credibility of the source. . . . Nor does it 
indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be 
independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed 
to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. . . . It simply requires 
that enough information be presented to the Comissioner to enable hi·m to 
rnake the J·udgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently 
supported to J·ustify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal 
process." !d., at 224-225 (emphasis added). 
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many sh~pe_s and sizes from many different types of persons. ~~we said I~ :4da~s v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972), 
~rmants tips, like all other clues and evidence coming to 
a P_oli~~ma~ on ~~e scene may vary greatly in their value and 
reliability. Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such 
diversity. "One simple rule will not cover every situation." 
Ibid. 7 
7 The diversity of informants' tips, as well as the usefulness of the total-
ity of the circumstances approach to probable cause, is reflected in our 
prior decisions on the subject. In Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 
271 (1960), we held that probable cause to search petitioners' apartment 
was established by an affidavit based principally on an informant's tip. 
The unnamed informant claimed to have purchased narcotics from petition-
ers at their apartment; the affiant stated that he had been given correct 
information from the informant on a prior occasion. This, and the fact that 
petitioners had admitted to police officers on another occasion that they 
were narcotics users, sufficed to support the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause. 
Likewise, in Rugendorfv. United States, 376 U. S. 528 (1964), the Court 
upheld a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to be-
lieve that certain stolen property would be found in petitioner's apartment. 
The affidavit submitted to the magistrate stated that certain furs had been 
stolen, and that a confidential informant, who previously had furnished 
confidential information, said that he saw the furs in petititoner's home. 
Moreover, another confidential informant, also claimed to be reliable, 
stated that one Schweihs had stolen the furs. Police reports indicated that 
petitioner had been seen in Schweihs' company and a third informant 
stated that petitioner was a fence for Schweihs. 
Finally, in Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), we held that informa-
tion within the knowledge of officers who searched the Ker's apartment 
provided them with probable cause to believe drugs would be found there. 
The officers were aware that one Murphy had previously sold marijuana to 
a police officer; the transaction had occurred in an isolated area, to which 
Murphy had led the police. The night after this transaction, police ob-
served Ker and Murphy meet in the same location. Murphy approached 
Ker's car, and, although police could see nothing change hands, Murphy's 
modus operandi was identical to what it had been the night before. More-
over, when police followed Ker from the scene of the meeting with Murphy 
he managed to lose them after performing an abrupt U -turn. Finally, the 
police had a statement from an informant who had provided reliable in-
/ 
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More~ver, the "two-pronged test" directs analysis into two 
largely mdependent channels-the informant's "veracity" or 
"reliability" and his "basis of knowledge." See nn. 4 and 5 
supra. There are persuasive arguments against according 
these two elements such independent status. Instead, they 
are better understood as relevant considerations in the total-
ity of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided 
probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be 1 
compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a 
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other 
indicia of reliability. See, e. g., Adams v. Williams, supra, 
407 U. S., at 14~147; Harris v. United States, 403 U. S. 573 
(1971). 
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the un-
usual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal 
activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thor-
oughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not 
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based 
on his tip. See United States v. Sellers, 483 F. 2d 37 (CA5 
1973). 8 Likewise, if an unquestionably honest citizen comes 
forward with a report of criminal activity-which if fabri-
cated would subject him to criminal liability-we have found 
rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. 
Adams v. Williams, supra. Conversely, even if we enter-
tain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and 
detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a 
statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles 
formation previously, that Ker was engaged in selling marijuana, and that 
his source was Murphy. We concluded that "To say that this coincidence 
of information was sufficient to support a reasonable belief of the officers 
that Ker was illegally in possession of marijuana is to indulge in under-
statement." I d., at 36. 
8 Compare Stanley v. State, 313 A. 2d 847, 861 (Md. App. 1974), reason- J 
ing that "Even assuming 'credibility' amounting to sainthood, the judge 
still may not accept the bare conclusion of a sworn and known and trusted 
police-affiant." 
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his tip to greate · h . 
Unlike a . r we~g t than might otherwise be the case. 
balan totahty of Circumstances analysis, which permits a 
i . . ced asse~sn:~nt of the relative weights of all the various ndi~:a ~f rehab1hty (and unreliability) attending an infor-
n:an s tip, ~he "t:vo-pronged test" has encouraged an exces-SIVe~y tec~mcal dissection of informants' tips, 9 with undue at-
tent~on bemg focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly 
be divorced from the other facts presented to the magistrate. 
As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348 
(1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related 
context, that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its 
9 Some lower court decisions, brought to our attention by the State, re-
flect a rigid application of such rules. In Bridger v. State, 503 S. W. 2d 801 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974), the affiant had received a confession of armed rob-
bery from one of two suspects in the robbery; in addition, the suspect had 
given the officer $800 in cash stolen during the robbery. The suspect also 
told the officer that the gun used in the robbery was hidden in the other 
suspect's apartment. A warrant issued on the basis of this was invali-
dated on the ground that the affidavit did not satisfactorily describe how 
the accomplice had obtained his information regarding the gun. 
Likewise, in People v. Palanza, 371 N. E. 2d 687 (Ill. App. 1978), the 
affidavit submitted in support of an application for a search warrant stated 
that an informant of proven and uncontested reliability had seen, in specifi-
cally described premises, "a quantity of a white crystalline substance which 
was represented to the informant by a white male occupant of the premises 
to be cocaine. Informant has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in 
the past and is thoroughly familiar with its appearance. The informant 
states that the white crystalline powder he observed in the above de-
scribed premises appeared to him to be cocaine.'' The warrant issued on 
the basis of the affidavit was invalidated because ''There is no indication as 
to how the infonnant or for that matter any other person could tell whether 
a white substance was cocaine and not some other substance such as sugar 
or salt.'' /d., at 689. 
Finally, in People v. Brethauer, 482 P. 2d 369 (Colo. 1971), an informant, 
stat to have supplied reliable information in the past, claimed that 
L. S. D. and marijuana were located on certain premises. The affiant 
suppl· police with drugs, which were tested by police and confirmed to be 
illegal substances. The affidavit setting forth these, and other, facts was 
found defective under both prongs of Spinelli. 
20 
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~~al acceptation, means less than evidence which would jus-t~ condemnation . . . . It imports a seizure made under 
c~cumstances which warrant suspicion." More recently, we 
~ru~ ~hat "the quanta . . . of proof' appropriate in ordinary 
JUdicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a 
warrant. Brinegar, supra, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely-tuned 
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have / 
no place in the magistrate's decision. While an effort to fix 
some general, numerically precise degree of certainty cor-
responding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is 
clear that "only the probability, and not a prima facie show-
ing, of crimin.al activity is the standard of probable cause." 
Spinelli, supra, 393 U. S., at 419. See Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure § 210.1(7) (Proposed Off. Draft 
1972). 
We also have recognized that affidavits "are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 
investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specific-
ity once exacted under common law pleading have no proper 
place in this area." Ventresca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108. 
(_Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued 
by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who cer-
tainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the 
nature of"probable cause." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 
407 U. S. 345, 34&-350 (1972). The rigorous inquiry into the 
Spinelli prongs and the complex superstructure of eviden-
tiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our 
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that 
many warrants are quite properly, ibid.-issued on the 
basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen ap-
plying a standard less demanding than those used in more 
formal legal proceedings. · ewiSe, given the context in 
which it must be applied, the "built-in subtleties," Stanley v. 
State, 313 A. 2d 847, 860 (Md. App. 1974), of the "two-
pronged test" are particularly troubling. 
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. uru arly, we have repeated! . 
tiny by courts of th ffi . y said that after-the-fact scru-
the form of d e su . Ciency of an affidavit should not take 
e novo review A m . t t , " . . 
of probable caus h · . ag1s ra e s determination 
ing courts " S ~ s l~_uld be paid great deference by review-
in · . ptne. t supra, 393 U. S., at 419. "A grudg-
g or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war-
rants" V t .t ' en resca, supra, 380 U. S., at 108, is inconsistent 
WI h the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant: "courts should not in-
validate . . . warrant(s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner." Id., 
at 109. 
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected 
to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, 
police might well resort to warrantl~ss searches, with the 
hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the 
warrant clause that might develop at the time of the search. 
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conduct-
ing an arrest or search greatly reduces the perception of un-
lawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring "the individual 
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority 
of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of 
his power to search." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 
1, 9 (1977). Reflecting this preference for the warrant proc-
ess, the traditional standard for review of an issuing magis-
trate's probable cause determination has been that so long as 
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud(ing]" 
that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the 
Fourth Amendment requires no more. Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 271 (1960). See United States v. Har-
ris, 403 U. S. 573, 577-583 (1971). 10 We think reaffirmation 
10 We also have said that "Although in a particular case it may not be 
easy to detennine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of proba-
ble cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should 
be largely detennined by the preference to be accorded to warrants," 
22 
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of this standard bett 
er serves the p 
course to the warrant r urpose of encouraging re-
our traditional defe p ocedure and Is more consistent with 
tions of magistrate rt~nce . to th~, probable cause determina-
Finall th . s . an Is the two-pronged test." 
P
oorly y, e ,?IrectiOn taken by decisions following Spinelli 
serves the most b . fu t· "t . . as1c nc Ion of any government": e~ P!;0v,~de. for the security of the individual and of his prop-
y. Without the reasonably effective performance of the 
task of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle 
to talk about human dignity and civilized values." Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 539 (1966) (WHITE, J.; dissenting). 
The strictures that inevitably accompany the "two-pronged 
test" cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforce-
ment, see, e. g., n. 9 supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme 
Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously ap-
plied in every case, anonymous tips seldom would be of any j 
value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary wit-
nesses, see Federal Rules of Evidence 701, Advisory Com-
mittee Note (1976), generally do not provide extensive recita-
tions of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, 
as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the ve-
racity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis 
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous \ 
tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of V 
the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when sup-
plemented by independent police investigation, frequently 
contribute to the solution of otherwise "perfect crimes." 
While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting 
r<' . 
Ventrescat supra,}380 U. S., at 109. This reflects both a desire to encour-
age use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once 
a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. Even 
if we were to accept the premise that the accurate assessment of probable 
cause would be furthered by the "two-pronged test," which we do not, 
these Fourth Amendment policies would require a less rigorous standard 
than that which appears to have been read into Aguilar and Spinelli. 
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that leaves virtually y r Fourth Amendment, a standard 
mants is not. no P ace for anonymous citizen infor-
For all these reason 1 don the "t s, we cone ude that it is wiser to aban- / I 
A ·z wo-p~onged test" established by our decisions in · f:J: a~ and Sptnelli. 11 In _its place we reaffirm the totality ------
0 e Circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed 
probable c~use determinations. See Jones v. United States, 
supra; Untted States v. Ventresca, supra; Brinegar v. United 
States, supra. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, in-
cluding the "veracity'' and "basis of knowledge" of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probabilit that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure 
that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . conclud-
[in " t probable cause existed. Jones v. United States, 
su n , 62 U. S., at 271. We are convinced that this flexi-
b e, easily applied standard will better achieve the accommo-
11 The Court's decision in Spinelli has been the subject of considerable 
criticism, both by members of this Court and others. Justice BLACKMUN, 
concurring in United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, 585-586 (1971), noted 
his long-held view "that Spinelli . . . was wrongly decided" by this Co::.=-::>---.. 
Justice Black similarly would have overruled that decision. Ibid. Like-
wise, a noted commentator has observed that "[t]he Aguilar-Spine t or-
mulation has provoked apparently ceaseless litigation." SA Moore's Fed-
eral Practice ~ 41.04 (1981). 
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would, 
under the view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause, 
we think it would not be profitable to decide. There are so many variables 
in the probable cause equation that one determination will seldom be a use-
ful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that while we in no way 
abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and for the 
principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of 
probable cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by ome of its 
language. 
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dation of pub I. . m Ic and privat . fr~nt req~ires than does et~:terests that the Fourth Amend-
m Agut~ar and Spinelli. approach that has developed 
. Our earher cases illust 
Istrate may not ventur:a~e ~he ~imits beyond which a mag-
statement of an affiant tha I~ Issumg a warrant. A sworn 
believe that" liquor ill t he has c~use to suspect and does 
located on cert . egal~y brought mto the United States is 
United States 2~n premises will not do. Nathanson v. 
vide th . ' 0 U ·. S. 41 (1933). An affidavit must pro-
th . e magistrate With a substantial basis for determining 
e eXIstence. of probable cause, and the wholly conclusory 
statement at Issue in Nathanson failed to meet this require-
ment. An officer's statement that "affiants have received 
relia?I~ information from a credible person and believe" that 
herom Is stored in a home, is lik~wise inadequate. Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964). As in Nathanson, this is a 
mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtu-
ally no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable 
cause. Sufficient information must be presented to the mag-
istrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue.:§ 
conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which 
warrants are issued. But when we move beyond the "bare 
bones" affidavits present in cases such as Nathanson and / 
Aguilar, this area simply does not lend itself to a prescribed V 
set of rules, like that which had developed from Spinelli. 
Instead, the flexible, common-sense standard articulated in 
Jones, Ventresca, and Brinegar better serves the purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent suggests in several places 
that the approach we take today somehow downgrades the 
role of the neutral magistrate, because Aguilar and Spinelli 
"preserve the role of magistrates as independent arbiters of 
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b . e cause. ,, 25 elieve is th . . . Post at 14 . 
' e case Th ' · Quite th 
requirement of th .F e essential protect. e fcontrary' we 
v U ·t e ourth A d Ion o the warrant 
[the nt ed ~tates, 333 U. S. ~~n lment, _as.stated in Johnson 
d usual Inferences which r ( 948), Is m "requiring that 
ence] be drawn b easonable men draw from evi-
stead of being jud ~ ~ neutral and detached magistrate in-
petitive enterpris~e f r the ~fficer engaged in the often com-
Nothing in our o .. o . erretmg out crime." !d., at 13--14. 
magistrate to d Pillion m any way lessens the authority of the 
the m t . 
1 
raw such reasonable inferences as he will from 
a er1a supplied to h. b 1· d d h . Im Y app Icants for a warrant· in-
S e~ ' .e IS freer than under the regime of Aguilar 'and j 
Pt_nellt to draw such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if 
- he Is so minded. 
The real gist of JUSTICE BRENNAN's criticism seems to be 
a second argument, somewhat at odds with the first, that 
magistrates should be restricted in their aUthority to make 
probable cause determinations by the standards laid down in 
Aguilar and Spinelli, and that such findings "should not be 
authorized unless there is some assurance that the informa-
tion on which they are based has been obtained in a reliable 
way by an honest or credible person." However, under our 
opinion magistrates remain perfectly free to exact such as-
surances as they deem necessary, as well as those required 
by this opinion, in making probable cause determinations. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN would apparently prefer that magistrates 
be restricted in their findings of probable cause by the devel-
opment of an elaborate body of case law dealing with the "ve-
racity'' prong of the Spinelli test, which in turn is broken 
down into two "spurs"-the informant's "credibility" and the 
"reliability'' of his information, together with the "basis of 
knowledge" prong of the Spinelli test. See n. 4, supra. 
That such a labyrinthine body of judicial refinement bears 
any relationship to familiar definitions of probable cause is 
hard to imagine. Probable cause deals "with probabilities. 
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conside t. echmcal; they ar th 
dent ra Ions of everyday life one .e factual and practical 
St men, not legal techn· . Which reasonable and pru-
ates, 338 U. S. 160, 175 (;c~~~s), act," Brinegar v. United 
JUSTICE BRENNAN' . . 
such as 'practical ' ' s disse~t also suggests that "words 
used in the Court'~ 
0 
~o?techmcal,' and 'common sense,' as 
permissive att•t d Pinion, are ?ut code words for an overly-
the right 1 u e towards pohce practices in derogation of 
17. An s secured by the Fourth Amendment." Infra, p. 
t 
easy, but not a complete, answer to this rather florid 
s atem t ld b . --I en wou e that nothmg we know about Justice Rut-ed~e suggests that he would have used the words he chose in 
Bnnegar in such a manner. More fundamentally, no one 
doubts that "under our Constitution only measures consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by govern-
ment to cure [the horrors of drug trafficking]," post, at 17; 
but this agreement does not advance the inquiry as to which 
measures are, and which measures are not, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment. "Fidelity" to the commands of the 
Constitution suggests balanced judgment rather than ex-
hortation. The highest "fidelity'' is achieved neither by the 
judge who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the 
most bizarre claim of individual constitutional rights, any 
more than it is achieved by a judge who instinctively goes 
furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of govern-
mental authorities. The task of this Court, as of other , 
courts, is to "hold the balance true," and we think we have 
done that in this case. 
IV 
Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analy-
sis outlined above have consistently recognized the value of 
corroboration of details of an informant's ti independent 
police work. In Jones v. U riited States, supra 362 U. S., at 
269, we held that an affidavit relying on say "is not to be 
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dee d . 27 ~e Insufficient on that 
basis for crediting the h s~ore, so long as a substantial 
say that even in m ki earsay Is presented." We went on to 
rely upon irrf, ~ ng a warrantless arrest an officer "may 
than u . or~ation received through an informant rather 
St t pon ~Is direct observations, so long as the inf~rmant's a ement 1s re bl "th. h asona Y corroborated by other matters 
": ~n t e office:'s knowledge." Ibid. Likewise, we recog-
~e t.he probative value of corroborative efforts of police of-
Cials I.n Aguilar-the source of the "two-pronged test"-by 
observmg that if the police had made some effort to corrobo-
rate the informant's report at issue "an entirely different 
" ' ~ case would have been presented. Aguilar,. supra, 378 
U. S., at 109, n. 1. 
Our decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 
(1959), however, is the classic case on the value of corrobora-
tive efforts of police officials. There, an informant named 
Hereford reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a 
train from Chicago on one of two days, and that he would be 
carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a 
fairly detailed physical description of Draper, and predicted 
that he would be wearing a light colored raincoat, brown 
slacks and black shoes and would be walking "real fast." 
' . 
I d., at 309. Hereford gave no indication of the basis for h1s 
infonnation. 12 
On one of the stated dates "fl.Olice officers observed a man 
matching this descriptio e I · a train arriving from Chicago; 
12 The tip in Draper might well not have survived the rigid application of 
the "two-pronged test" that developed following Spinelli. The only refer-
ence to Hereford's reliability was that he had ''been engaged as a 'special 
employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about six months, and 
from time to time gave infomation to [the police] for small sums of money, 
and that [the officer] had alwys found the information given by Hereford to 
be accurate and reliable." 358 U. S., at 309. Likewise, the tip gave no 
indication of how Hereford came by his information. At most, the detailed 
and accurate predictions in the tip indicated that, however Hereford ob-
tained his information, it was reliable. 
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lus attire and lugga ~al~ng rapidly. ~= :atc~ed ~ereford's report and he was 
m his investigation th plam~d m Draper that, by this point 
ified every facet of ihe ~~rrestn~g o~cer "had personally ver-
cept whether et·t· ormatwn ~ven him by Hereford ex-
the three oun p 
1 ~o~er ~ad acc~mphshed his mission and had 
surely with ces 0 ermn o"!l his person or in his bag. And 
in th' every other hit of Hereford's information be-
g us personally verified, [the officer] had 'reasonable 
f"ounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Here- / ~ord' · .c · . s IDJ.ormation-that Draper would have the heroin with 
him-was likewise true," id., at 313. 
The showing of probable cause in the present case was fully 
as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing alone, the 
facts obtained through the independent investigation of 
Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the GatesWere 
involved in drug trafficking. In addition to being a popular 
vacation site, Florida is well-known as a source of narcotics 
and other illegal drugs. See United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U. S. 544, 562 (1980) (POWELL, J., concurring); DEA, 
Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, The Supply of Drugs to the 
U. S. Illicit Market From Foreign and Domestic Sources 10 
(1979). Lance Gates's flight to Palm Beach, his brief, over-
night stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return north 
to Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in / 
West Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug 
run, as it is of an ordinary vacation trip. 
In addition, the magistrate could rely on the anonymous 
letter, which had been corroborated in major part by Mader's 
efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 13 The Supreme 
13 The Illinois Supreme Court thought that the verification of details con-
tained in the anonymous letter in this case amounted only to "the corrobo-
ration of innocent activity," J. A. 12a, and that this was insufficient to sup-
port a finding of probable cause. We are inclined to agree, however, with 
the observation of Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that "In this 
case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became suspicious in 
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o lmois reasoned th . 
wh? had given reliable i at Drr:per Involve? an informant ~hile the honesty and r li n~~~ation on previous ?ccasions, 
In this case w e a 1 ty of the anonymous Informant 
While this disti er~ u~nown to the Bloomingdale police. 
lice de rt ncbon might be an apt one at the time the po-
l . pa.fi ment received the anonymous letter it became far 
ess Sigru cant after Mader's independent inve~tigative work 
~~curred. The corroboration of the letter's predictions that 
e Gates's car would be in Florida that Lance Gates would 
fly to Florida in the next day or so: and that he would drive 
t~e car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not 
With certainty, that the informant's other assertions also 
were true. "Because an informant is right about some 
things, he is more probably right about other facts," Spinelli, 
supra, 393 U. S., at 427 (WHITE, J., concurring)-including 
the claim regarding the Gates's illegal activity. This may 
well not be the type of "reliability" or "veracity" necessary to 
satisfy some views of the "veracity prong" of Spinelli, but we ~ 
think it suffices. for the practical, common-sense judgment 
called for in making a probable cause determination. It is 
the light of the initial tip." J. A. 18a. And it bears noting that all of the 
corroborating detail established in Draper, supra, was of entirely innocent 
activity-a fact later pointed out by the Court in both Jones v. United 
States, 362 U. S. 257, 269-270 (1960), and Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 
36 (1963). 
This is perfectly reasonable. As discussed previously, probable cause 
requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 
actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent be-
havior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to 
require otherwise would be'f o sub silentio impose a drastically more rigor-
...,; 
ous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands. 
We think the Illinois court attempted a too rigid classification of the types 
of conduct that may be relied upon in seeking to demonstrate probable 
cause. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2 (1979). In making a 
detennination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether par-
ticular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty," but the degree of su picion that 
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts. 
Sl-430-0PINION 
30 
ILLINOIS v. GATES 
enough, for purposes f . 
"conoboration th 0 assessmg probable cause, that 
the chances f rough other sources of information reduced 
ing "a s b t 
0 ~ ~ecki:ss or prevaricating tale," thus provid-
U .t d Su s antia basis for crediting the hearsay." Jones v. 
;-. e 
11 
tates supra,\362 U. S., at 269, 271. 
I~a Y' t~e anonymous letter contained a range of details 
:elatmg not JUst to easily obtained facts and conditions exist-
Ing .at t~e time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties 
?rd1nar1ly not easily predicted. The letter writer's accurate 
Information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of 
a character likely obtained only from the Gates themselves, 
or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary 
travel plans. If the informant had access to accurate in-
formation of this type a magistrate could properly conclude 
that it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable in-
formation of the Gates's alleged illegal activitieS. 14 Of 
14 The dissent seizes on one inaccuracy in the anonymous informant's let-
ter-its statement that Sue Gates would fly from Florida to Illinois, when 
in fact she drove-and argues that the probative value of the entire tip was 
undermined by this allegedly "material mistake." We have never re-
quired that informants used by the police be infallible, and can see no rea-
son to impose such a requirement in this case. Probable cause, particu-
larly when police have obtained a warrant, simply does not require the 
perfection the dissent finds necessary. Moreover, the character of the in-
formant's "mistake" does little to reduce the reliability of the informant's 
tip. Sue Gates's decision to revise her travel plans is no different from the 
last-minute changes that travellers frequently are wont to make. It 
scarcely is reasonable to require the informant to have predicted this kind 
of change, as well as the other details that he was right about. 
Likewise, there is no force to the dissent's argument that the Gates's ac-
tion in leaving their home unguarded undercut the informant's claim that 
drugs were hidden there. Indeed, the line-by-line scrutiny that the dis-
sent applies to the anonymous letter is akin to that we find inappropriate in './ 
reviewing magistrate's decisions. The dissent apparently attributes to 
the magistrate who issued the warrant in this case the rather implausible 
notion that persons dealing in drugs always stay at home, apparently out of 
fear that to leave might risk intrusion by criminals. If accurate, one could 
not help sympathizing with the self-imposed isolation of people so situated. 
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course, the Gates's t . 
from a talkat· . ravel plans might have been learned 
pronged t t"Ive neighbor or travel agent; under the "two-
detail . :~ developed from Spinelli, the character of the 
. t1 s m e anonymous letter might well not permit a suffi-
Cien Y clear inference regarding the letter writer's "basis of 
knowledge." But, as discussed previously, supra, , 
P~obable cause does not demand the certainty we associate 
WI~~ formal trials. It is enough that there was a fair prob-
ability that the writer of the anonymous letter had obtained 
his entire story either from the Gates or someone they 
trusted. And corroboration of major portions of the letter's 
predictions provides just this probability. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the judge issuing the warrant had a "substan-
~ tial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause to search 
the Gates's home and car existed. The judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois therefore must be 
Reversed. 
In reality, however, it is scarcely likely that the magistrate ever thought 
that the anonymous tip "kept one spouse" at home, much less that he relied 
on the theory advanced by the dissent. The letter simply says that Sue 
would fly from Florida to Illinois, without indicating whether the Gates's 
made the bitter choice of leaving the drugs in their house, or those in their 
car, unguarded. The magistrate's determination that there might be 
drugs or evidence of criminal activity in the Gates's home was well-sup-
ported by the less speculative theory, noted in text, that if the infonnant 
could predict with considerable accuracy the somewhat unusual travel 
plans of the ~' he probably also had a reliable basis for his statements 
that the Ga (s's]Eept a large quantity of drugs in their home and frequently 
were visited by other drug traffickers there. 
? 
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